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R E S U LT S
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More Effective and Efficient: Discovering
‘Catalytic Combinations’ in Public Child
Welfare Reform
Dara Menashi, Ph.D., and Christopher Behan, M.S.W., Consultants to the Child Welfare
Strategy Group, Annie E. Casey Foundation; Kathleen Noonan, J.D.,
University of Wisconsin Law School
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Key Points
· This article describes work of the Annie E. Casey
Foundation’s Casey Strategic Consulting Group
(CSCG), a 10-year, multistate initiative that embeds outside experts – both public-system and
traditional management consulting – in child and
family services systems to improve system performance and outcomes.
· The article describes five types of levers that were
influenced in different combinations to promote
change in different state systems. We call these
“catalytic combinations.”
· In numerous states, including Maine, Louisiana,
Virginia, and Indiana, the CSCG initiative produced
measurable improvements in key performance
areas, including shortening stays in foster care,
improving rates of permanent placements for children in foster care, reductions in foster-care recidivism, and improving the percentages of children
“aging out” of foster care who leave the system
with a strong community/family connection.
· Different states have different strengths and challenges. What worked in one place won’t necessarily work in another. The authors’ postulate,
however, that by influencing “levers of change” in
combination, one can drive broad improvement in
how overall systems operate.
· Turning systems around is a long-range and difficult exercise, and one that is never complete. Influencing catalytic combinations creates sufficient
startup results for improvements to continue over
time.

In a state with a national reputation for being one
of the best run in the country, it was an early and
unpleasant eye-opener for newly elected Virginia
Governor Tim Kaine: The commonwealth sported
the worst record in the country when it came to
children aging out of foster care absent any permanent connection to family or community. Said
Kaine, who took office in 2006,
When we saw the data we realized that what we
knew anecdotally to be a problem was in fact persistent and pervasive, that Virginia was a clear outlier,
with fewer discharges from foster care to permanency of any state. (Walters, 2010)

But while Kaine may have viewed Virginia as an
outlier, the fact is that many states continue to
struggle when it comes to moving children out of
foster care and into permanent homes with families. It is a simple reflection of a persistent problem: Public agencies assigned the difficult task of
improving outcomes for vulnerable populations –
poor children and families – have a mixed record.
An extensive body of literature proposes various
solutions for improving the performance of such
agencies. Yet there has never been – nor is there
ever likely to be – any silver bullet in this area.
Complex systems, like complex families, have
diverse strengths and needs, requiring thoughtful, tailored assistance; and transforming them
sometimes requires novel solutions.
One emerging and promising approach to
such system change is the concept of “catalytic
mechanisms,” developed by management expert
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Jim Collins (2001) and employed to remarkable
effect in reforming Virginia’s child welfare system.
Catalytic mechanisms are, according to Collins,
“the crucial link between objectives and performance.” They are “catalytic,” he argues, because
they produce unexpected results, redistribute
power, create positive and negative consequences,
and have an ongoing effect. For example, Collins
(1999) cites a gravel company’s new approach to
customer satisfaction as a “catalytic mechanism”:
giving customers the right to pay only for those
services they deem satisfactory. Once adopted,
Collins reports that this policy radically and permanently improved the company’s performance
and profitability.
While these so-called catalytic mechanisms may
sound simple (too simple, really), Collins points
out that it takes strategic thinking to identify and
leverage the catalytic mechanisms that lead to improved performance. The change in billing policy
was strategic because it was not the act alone that
had so much impact, but rather its connection to
other parts of the company’s system that made
the difference. Clearly, the short-pay policy forces
both learning and change.
It impels managers to relentlessly track down the
root causes of problems in order to prevent repeated
short payments. It signals to employees and customers alike that Granite Rock is dead serious about
customer satisfaction that goes far beyond slogans.
(Collins, 1999, p. 73)

in-house strategic consulting group to work with
state and local government human-services agencies engaged in system-reform efforts. The CSCG
teams combined staff with traditional consulting
experience with staff with nonprofit and publicsector experience. The foundation invested in
CSCG teams , which were assigned to state or city
“clients,” as an alternative to traditional grantmaking. Teams worked intensively at client sites on a
weekly basis like private-sector consulting teams,
in contrast to the more occasional technical assistance help that was offered by the foundation.

The foundation invested in CSCG
teams, which were assigned to state
or city “clients,” as an alternative
to traditional grantmaking. Teams
worked intensively at client sites
on a weekly basis like privatesector consulting teams, in contrast
to the more occasional technical
assistance help that was offered by
the foundation.

The “catalytic combinations” approach evolved
The question we consider in this article is whether over a series of multi-year engagements with
child welfare agencies around the country. Althe concept of catalytic mechanisms can be applied in the public sector – to child welfare in par- though we focus on using catalytic mechanisms
to change public child welfare systems, we believe
ticular. Specifically, we want to see if it can help
that it has broad application for all client-oriented
public agencies serve children more effectively
public agencies, including education, health,
and efficiently, and achieve well-defined objecmental health, and juvenile justice. The difficulty
tives.
of improving the results of public-sector agencies
has been widely documented in both the profesThe approach described here was developed
sional and academic literature, spawning many
by the authors while working as employees and
consultants with the Casey Strategic Consulting
Group (CSCG) of the Annie E. Casey FoundaKim, Jacqueline Melton, Emily Prevas, Gretchen Test, and
tion.1 In 2001, the foundation created CSCG as an Tanya Washington. See Annie E. Casey Foundation work1 This work owes much to the experience and work of
many CSCG members, including Karen Angelici, Ayanna
Baker, Elisha Gilliam, Kathleen Feely, Tracey Feild, John
THE
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ing papers: Rightsizing Congregate Care: A Powerful First
Step in Transforming Child Welfare Systems (2010); Fixing a
Broken System: Transforming Maine’s Child Welfare System
(2009); and Back on Track: Transforming Virginia’s Child
Welfare System (2010).
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approaches including David Osborn’s Reinventing
Government (1993), Michael Barzelay’s Breaking
Through Bureaucracy (1992), and Michel Barber’s
Instructions to Deliver (2007). The approach we
describe here is tailored for a client-serving public
system that depends on frontline workers to
achieve change.

Public Child Welfare Systems
Public child welfare agencies are charged with
keeping children safe from abuse and neglect.
Based on CSCG’s experience, we have found
that such agencies tend to share a core set of
problems, including a lack of significant family
participation (especially by parents who have
been accused of abuse or neglect); insufficient
supply of community-based services, including an
adequate number of high-quality foster homes;
inadequate financial incentives regarding use
of high-cost institutional placements over less
expensive community-based services; and policies, practices, and organizational dynamics that
frequently fail to keep pace with evidence-based
interventions.

When we focused on a specific
problem we discovered we could
leverage that tight focus toward
achieving systemwide improvement
if the solution forced learning
and change in other parts of the
organization. The key was to focus
on one strategic problem with a
combination of actions, thus our
term for the phenomenon: “catalytic
combinations.”
Crisis – child fatalities in particular – frequently
drives change in public child welfare systems.
Typically such crises lead to a political firestorm,
16

but little actual system change. Based on CSCG
engagements around the country, we discovered that leaders respond to crisis in one of two
ways: They either add a new process to already
overly bureaucratic systems or they try to blame
a specific person or policy, which often results
in someone being fired or in some immediate
yet symbolic policy changes. Because both of
these responses result in leaders making changes
without first conducting a thorough analysis of
a system’s strengths and shortcomings, the net
result is that all too often nothing gets fundamentally fixed.
Further, we found that in large, complex government agencies, working on numerous problems
at once is not an effective strategy for pushing fundamental change, nor is trying to create
reform by changing one policy or practice. When
we focused on a specific problem, however, we
discovered we could leverage that tight focus
toward achieving systemwide improvement if the
solution forced learning and change in other parts
of the organization. The key was to focus on one
strategic problem with a combination of actions,
thus our term for the phenomenon: “catalytic
combinations.”
That is the essence of the catalytic-mechanism
design. The change in the gravel company’s customer satisfaction policy, described by Collins,
was catalytic because it focused on one fundamental company issue – improving customer
satisfaction, which, when “solved,” caused a chain
reaction in how staff dealt with customers, how
managers dealt with problems, how staff got paid,
and others.
The question for CSCG was whether and how a
change strategy that seemed to work well in the
business world could be adapted to a large public
system.

New York City
The first opportunity to test and adapt Collins’
approach came in 2003, when New York City’s
Administration for Children’s Services (ACS)
approached CSCG for help on what would
otherwise have been considered a narrow reform
request: reducing the use of congregate or instiTHE
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Consequently, these subsystems became our
tutional placements for teenagers. Congregate
“levers of change” that needed to be deployed in
care refers to 24-hour residential group facilities
combination to affect fundamental change.
for children in state or local custody. Research
indicates that the therapeutic value of congregate care is suspect, especially as stays lengthen.
Some studies, in fact, show outcomes to be worse.
What’s more, congregate care placements can
Every organization is made up of
cost six to 10 times more than family-based placesubsystems – that is, parts of the
ments (Barth, 2002).
Despite years of successful permanency and prevention efforts that reduced the New York City
foster-care population by 27 percent from 1996 to
2001 (Casey Strategic Consulting Group, 2003),
the number of teens in congregate care rose five
percent over the same time period. At the time,
nearly two-thirds of the teens who entered care
were placed in congregate care facilities. In 2003,
ACS decided to ratchet up reform by focusing
on reducing the number of teens in institutional
placements. An additional incentive was a city
budget reduction target that ACS vowed would
be absorbed by savings related to reduced use of
congregate care.
Our first step in adapting Collins’ approach was
to map out how potential changes to congregate
care might cascade through a system. Every organization is made up of subsystems – that is, parts
of the organization that interact and combine to
create the overall system. Our experience led us
to focus on five specific subsystems within the
child welfare agency because these, in combination, had the potential to have the fundamental
disruptive impact on a public organization that
Collins describes:
• Service array: The array of public and private
programs, placements, and service options
available for children and families.
• Frontline practice: How caseworkers interact
day to day with clients.
• Finance: What is and is not paid for, and how.
• Performance management: Regular use of outcome measures and trends to make decisions
and guide the agency.
• Policy: The official rules and regulations that
underpin day-to-day practice of child welfare
workers.
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organization that interact and
combine to create the overall system.
Our experience led us to focus on
five specific subsystems within the
child welfare agency because these,
in combination, had the potential
to have the fundamental disruptive
impact on an organization that
Collins describes.
A second step was translating Collins’ description
of the effects of catalytic mechanisms to a publicsector setting. Collins explains that activities are
“catalytic” when they incorporate five distinct
characteristics, which we applied and defined for
the public sector (see Table 1).
The congregate care reduction effort in New York
City focused on three levers of change: service
array – decreasing the number of congregate beds
available for placement; performance management – using outcomes data to make funding
decisions to eliminate group-home programs with
the weakest outcomes; and new frontline practice,
which emphasized talking with teens to identify
potential family or “kinship” placement options
instead of institutional placements.
Selecting the right combination of levers to
achieve a catalytic effect is equal parts art and
science. The “science” is identifying the right actions to disrupt the system in a way that improves
results for children and family. The effect has to
be measurable and needs to have a baseline and
17
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TABLE 1

Collins’ characteristics of
catalytic mechanisms

Produces desired results in
unpredictable ways

Public-sector child welfare application

Producing quick results in unpredictable ways meant producing quick results
with no additional resources.

Distributes power for the
Redistributing power for child welfare involved changing who makes decisions
benefit of the overall system about removal and placements. This meant shifting the decision from the
agency alone to a group that included children and families, judges, guardians
ad litem, private providers, and community members.
Has ‘sharp teeth’
(consequences)

Having ‘sharp teeth’ meant real consequences for system actors who are
normally immune to the results they produce. Consequences might include
new scrutiny for frontline workers or supervisors who do not justify particular
actions or a reduced census for private providers who perform poorly on
identified practice measures.

Ejects viruses

Because removing workers and defunding institutions is neither easy nor
quick, the public system had to focus on a positive version (‘injecting
antibodies’) rather than ‘ejecting viruses’: promoting people who are
champions of change and expanding programs that work.

Produces an ongoing effect

Meant initial positive results for a pilot group of clients that is expanded to a
larger population of children and families. It also meant structural changes and
policies put in place to support continuing changes.

a target goal. The “art” involves figuring out what
is politically and organizationally feasible. In New
York City, the agency already decided to reduce
the number of congregate care beds, so it was natural to adopt the strategy of changing the service
array. New York also had a tremendous amount of
performance data on its providers (a rare occurrence in child welfare), so leveraging performance
management fit naturally in the existing organization. We also focused on frontline practice, not
because it fit with what the city was already doing,
but because addressing how placement decisions were made for teens was a prerequisite for
broader reform. The levers we chose played both
to the strengths of the client and to the necessary
prerequisites to change – including behaviors
that had the power to stop reform if they were not
addressed.

residential beds more quickly, other sites followed
what might be called an attrition strategy.

As CSCG expanded and adapted this approach
beyond New York City, we learned that a critical part of every engagement was working with
clients2 to determine which combination of
levers was right for the particular context. While
some sites, like New York City, elected to “close”

As a beginning point in New York City, each congregate care provider was evaluated on outcomes
related to how quickly they moved children into
either stable alternative placements or into permanent placements.3 This focus on performance
was logical inasmuch as the goal to eliminate 600
beds (out of approximately 4,400) was in part
going to be achieved by shutting down poor performers.4 To ensure that teens living in facilities
targeted for closure were not simply transferred
to other congregate care facilities, ACS worked
with multiple stakeholders – including casework
and supervisory staff, providers, families, legal
advocates, and permanency experts – to design a
case-review process that focused on finding family placements for teens. Teams of social workers
interviewed teens to explore permanency options
based on existing adult connections, asking questions such as: “Whom do you trust? Who visits
you? Who is listed on your cell phone speed-dial?
Where do you go on holidays? With whom do you
want to live?” ACS teams then contacted signifi-

2
We used a broad definition of “client” and gathered input
from multiple stakeholders, including but not limited to
different layers of staff, providers, families, and courts, in
determining the best strategy.

3
New York City has some of the most detailed and extensive data on provider performance in the country.
4
The permanent closure was critical to overcome a “this
too shall pass” attitude of workers and providers.
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cant adults in teens’ lives to discuss permanency
options along with any support services needed
for such potential family placements.
The initial pilot caseworker teams, which included supervisors and managers, returned from
visits to the congregate care facilities surprised
by the number of potential individual placements
that teens were able to identify; caseworkers did
not expect to so quickly and easily move that
many children out of institutions. Over the summer of 2003, 11 agencies in New York voluntarily
closed 169 beds and transferred as many as 40
percent of teens to family-based settings (Casey
Strategic Consulting Group, 2003). Within a year,
more than 600 beds had closed.
What was the system impact of the drive to
reduce the use of congregate care – the disruption that led to positive change? First, it redistributed power to children and families so they
were involved in making decisions. Second, the
surprising ease with which children were moved
home helped begin debunking the belief that all
congregate care placements were appropriate and
necessary. Third, there were real financial consequences – lost contracts – for lower-performing
providers. When workers, supervisors, and
managers saw all the changes, they began to reevaluate how congregate care was being used and
get behind a new push for alternative placements.

encouraged teens to consider open-adoption arrangements that permitted contact with the birth
family and greatly enhanced family involvement
in case planning. Organizationally, ACS decided
to dramatically change its case-management
function on the heels of right-sizing’s success. The
effort changed the largely administrative role of
more than 400 case management workers to one
of quality assurance. It took a catalytic approach
to system reform through the congregate care
reduction work to position the system for broader
reform.

While reducing both the number of
children placed in congregate care
and the time they spend outside
of family settings is beneficial to
children, other subsystems needed
to change for the system to improve
safety, permanency, and well-being.

ACS has achieved remarkable results over time in
connection with its congregate care-bed strategy.
The number of contracted congregate care beds
decreased 47 percent, from 4,174 in 2002 to 2,192
in December 2008, with no increase in re-entry
While reducing both the number of children
placed in congregate care and the time they spend rates (New York City ACS, 2009). Bed capacity
outside of family settings is beneficial to children, stands at 1,440 today (New York City ACS, 2011).
other subsystems needed to change for the system Concurrent with the reduction in bed capacity,
ACS continues to reduce the percent of children
to improve safety, permanency, and well-being.
So, while the initial catalytic combinations started spending time in residential care, outpacing the
system reform, we found that follow-up was nec- national decline. (See Figure 1.)
essary to achieve Collins’ fifth criteria: “produces
an ongoing effect.” Employing catalytic combina- When the congregate care reform work began in
2003, two-thirds of teens were initially placed in
tions upfront is merely the beginning of reform.
congregate care, while one-third were placed in
In New York, the congregate care work was folfamily settings. By 2006 the reverse was true, with
lowed by other changes. For example, ACS instituted a practice that immediately begins planning two-thirds of teens initially placed with families.
for adoption as a contingency while still attempt- In addition, by 2009 New York City had reinvested more than $30 million of the money saved
ing to reunify a child with birth parents. Policy
by moving more children in congregate care into
was changed to require supervisory approval for
foster-parent support and aftercare services.
placement in a congregate care facility. ACS also
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FIGURE 1 Residential Care in NYC vs. National AFCARS Data

Source: NYC Flash Data 2011, National AFCARS Data

Embedding Catalytic Combinations in
Public-Sector Systems
Since 2003, we have employed our congregate
care reduction approach in multiple sites. The
complementing actions – the catalytic combinations – CSCG might recommend in any given
case were not predetermined, however, as indicated by the range of activities (see Table 2). In
fact, the art of system reform includes taking into
account the contingent and unique nature of each
child welfare agency’s subsystems along with the
specific challenges those agencies face. It takes
experience – along with a keen eye and ear and
the willingness to work directly with those on the
frontlines of service delivery – to scope out which
subsystems need to adapt in order to produce
broad, enduring change. But CSCG found that
with practice, experience, and the ability to be on
the ground for a significant amount of time, one
fundamental catalytic combination can, in fact,
yield relatively speedy and meaningful results that
help drive and actually embed change in complex
and historically change-averse systems. As our
work evolved, we identified a series of what we
call “embedding steps” that helped clients put into
place the additional changes needed to solidify
the reform effort.
Understanding the effective sequencing of
catalytic combinations became an important
factor for CSCG teams. For example, in order for
20

congregate care reduction to have an ongoing
impact, the system needed to build capacity to
replace congregate care beds with family-based
placements. To do this, practice around recruiting and retaining foster parents needed to change.
We concluded that starting the reform effort
with foster-family recruitment could not produce
catalytic change. Creating bed capacity in foster
families did not have sufficient leverage to shift
the system away from overreliance on congregate
care. However, after enacting the initial catalytic combination focused on congregate care
(by focusing on a new policy and performance
management, for example) the system was then
positioned to accommodate other reforms, such
as improving foster-parent recruitment.

Maine
In 2004, more than 27 percent of the children in
Maine’s foster-care system were in congregate
placement – far above the national average of 17
percent (Casey Strategic Consulting Group 2004).
The system had a strong bias against placing children with relatives and frequently placed children
far from their home communities, even out of
state. Working together, CSCG and Maine’s Office
of Children and Family Services (OCFS) proposed
removing 10 percent of children from congregate
care – 70 children in all – and transferring them
to permanent, home-based placements. To accomplish this, CSCG and OCFS looked at three
THE
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TABLE 2

Subsystems

Service array

Initial Catalytic Steps

•
•

Help providers switch from
residential care to communitybased services.
Discourage creation of
congregate placements.

Embedding Catalytic Steps

•
•
•
•

Frontline
practice

•
•
•

Talk to young people about
their placement preferences.
High-level staff participate in
meetings with children and
families.
Model success in a visible
jurisdiction.

•
•
•
•

Finance

•
•

Alter financial incentives for
congregate care.
Use flexible funding to create
more community services.

•
•
•
•

Performance
management

•
•
•

Policy and
regulation

•
•
•
•

Use performance measures
to evaluate congregate-care
providers.
Use consistent measures to
evaluate agency leadership.
Provide assistance to leaders
struggling to meet new
targets.

•

Require prior authorization for
placement in congregate care.
Require utilization reviews for
continued stays in congregate
care.
Limit use of independent living
as a case goal.
Prohibit the placement of
children under age 12 in
congregate facilities.

•
•

levers of change that they believed, done in combination, would support the initiative to reduce
congregate care.
The selection of levers in Maine followed the
strategic process used in New York City. First and
foremost, the combination of levers had to create
the disruptive consequences described by Collins.
THE
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•
•
•

•

Use targeted recruitment to increase community
foster homes.
Re-allocate funding to community-based services
from congregate care.
Use flexible funding to make more kin eligible as
caregivers.
Provide financial and technical assistance to
providers who want to change their service mix.
Increase engagement of parents and family
through Team Decision Making or Family Team
Meetings.
Highlight successful home-based placements for
unlikely children through regular communication.
Build leadership and frontline support for reform
by involving a range of staff members in designing
reforms.
Redesign training program to focus on
strengthening families.
Redirect savings from decreased use of
congregate care to community-based services.
Create flexible funding for customized support.
Finance the change process for private providers
who want to shift practice.
Provide financial support for kin placements.
Phase out contracts with poorly performing
providers.
Promote staff who support using less institutional
care.
Encourage staff who object to goals to leave the
agency.
Use performance data as a tool to manage staff
(regional managers, supervisors, case workers)
throughout the system.
Mandate search for potential kinship homes .
Mandate family-based concurrent planning for all
children.
Encourage youth to consider open adoption
arrangements that permit birth-family contact.

Second, we discovered that what was politically
and organizationally feasible in New York City
was not so in Maine, hence the “art” of selection.
Maine leadership had no interest in closing beds
right away, and the system did not have performance data on the providers. Accordingly, initial
changes focused on new policies that made it
more difficult for a caseworker to place and keep
21
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We discovered that what was
politically and organizationally
feasible in New York City was not
so in Maine, hence the “art” of
selection.
children in a congregate facility. OCFS worked to
revise key policies, instituting prior authorization
and utilization review for all ongoing institutional placements, which produced surprising
results – showing how easily children were safely
and effectively moved from congregate care. The
agency director also made a priority the creation
of a performance-tracking system that allowed
him to monitor the success of the regions and his
regional directors regarding the new policy. In
fact, the OCFS director took it upon himself to
personally monitor the congregate care census
each week, and each district director knew that
he or she would have to explain his or her performance at monthly staff meetings. Peer pressure
and natural competition then encouraged and
emboldened regional leaders to join the effort to
reduce the number of children in congregate care.
Leaders who did not support the new approach
were eventually removed. Finally, we also selected
practice change for the same reason we selected
it in New York City – if it did not change, nothing
else would matter. Initially, “permanency teams”
were designed and staffed to work with children
and families to brainstorm ways to move children
out of institutional settings. This change redistributed power from the caseworker alone to a team
that included children and families, when possible
and appropriate.5
As with New York City, the results achieved in
Maine were substantial and came with remarkable speed. After six months there was an eight
For more information, see Fixing a Broken System: Transforming Maine’s Child Welfare System, the Annie E. Casey
Foundation (2010). http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Topics/Child%20Welfare%20Permanence/Other/
FixingaBrokenSystemTransformingMainesChildWel/
AECF_FixingABrokenSystemFinal_Final.pdf

5
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percent reduction in children in congregate care,
and in two years a 46 percent reduction – 350
children. In July 2011, five percent of children in
Maine’s custody were in institutional settings,
making Maine one of the top performers nationally in limiting the use of congregate care.
Also parallel to the New York City experience, the
catalytic combination of policy, practice, and performance-management changes associated with
congregate care reform led to other systemwide
changes. Most notably, Maine initially shifted $4
million from congregate care placements to family “wraparound” and community-based service.6
The state continues to invest in developing an
array of community-based services, instituting
evidence-based programs such as Multisystemic
Therapy and Multidimensional-Treatment Foster
Care.

Virginia
According to Collins, “catalytic mechanisms
force the right things to happen even when those
in power have a vested interest allowing pointless, expensive practices stay in place” (Collins,
1999, p. 75). In Virginia, CSCG, working with
the newly- elected Gov. Tim Kaine, again used
a fundamental push on congregate care reduction to drive a catalytic change involving two
key levers. First, the group decided to work on
congregate care finance in a locally administered
child welfare system7 by adjusting how much the
state reimbursed localities for the shared cost of
foster-care placements. Second, the effort focused
on frontline practice, piloting a new approach to
foster-care placements in the city of Richmond.
This “top-down/bottom-up” approach was critical
in Virginia because children and family services
are locally administered with state oversight, so it
was essential that both state and local officials be
engaged in the reform effort.

6
Maine Office and Children & Family Services. Maine
Residential Provider Rate Report: Move Children to Less
Restrictive Care, Maine Office of the Budget 2004-2005.
7
In nine states, including Virginia, child welfare systems
are administered locally with state oversight. In these
states, counties receive some of their funding from the
state, but typically must match federal and state funds with
some portion of local funds.
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As part of a strategy to reduce congregate care,
CSCG recommended that the state start paying
a lower match rate to localities for congregate
care placements and a higher match rate for
community-based services provided on behalf
of children remaining in their own homes. The
governor’s office agreed that financing was clearly
a powerful subsystem driving local government
behavior, and so focused efforts on winning legislative support for the change in reimbursement
rates. Under the new funding formula, cities and
counties would be required to pay more to place
children in institutional settings. This financial disincentive had immediate and significant
financial consequences for local governments and
providers, as fully one-third of children statewide
and half of the children in Richmond were in
some congregate care setting at the time of the
initiative.
At the same time, CSCG and the Virginia team
sought to address frontline practice through a
pilot in Richmond aimed at both reducing the
number of congregate- care placements and
improving family engagement by helping institute
“Team Decision Making” (TDM),8 whereby
any interested stakeholders – family, teachers,
neighbors, friends, probation officers, clergy,
coaches – would come together and discuss possible placement and treatment options for a child.
This teaming model offered the child and family
a forum in which to speak up for their needs,
and took the onus for placement decisions off
the shoulders of a single caseworker. As a result,
workers were much more inclined to consider
alternatives to institutional placements.9
In Richmond, CSCG began with a pilot of 25 of
the 282 children in institutional care. These 25
were 17-year-olds and on the verge of “aging out”
of the system. Workers met with each teen to
discuss moving from a group home to a fam8
Team Decision Making is a teaming strategy originated
by Family to Family, an Annie E. Casey Foundation initiative, for making child welfare placement decisions.
9
Virginia created the Council on Reform (CORE) to draw
local support and buy-in by including local leaders in the
change process. Without this capacity building throughout
the system that supported the reform ideals, it is unlikely
that the results in Richmond would have taken root in
other counties.
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The original congregate care
catalytic-combination strategy,
along with subsequent reforms, has
had a profound effect: The number
of children in out-of-home care has
gone from 3,054 when reform started
to 1,467 in August 2011.
ily. Within weeks, half of the teens were able to
move to a family setting and another 15 percent
had a plan to move to a family setting within 60
days. Within two years of the start of the initiative, Richmond reduced the number of children
in foster care from 548 to 388 and the number of
children in congregate care from 282 to 71 (Virginia Department of Social Services, 2011).
This catalytic combination approach produced
three of the five characteristics of catalytic
change outlined by Collins: It produced desired
results in an unpredictable way by getting so
many children out of care in Richmond so easily,
it redistributed power to the families and the
community-based providers, and it had “sharp
teeth” in that the financial implications of placements had an immediate and significant impact
on local governments and providers.

Embedding Change in Maine and Virginia
After the initial congregate care reductions in
Maine, agency leaders instituted deeper changes.
They reoriented their mission and practice toward permanency for children. They have also expanded their performance-management system
to include outcome measures for supervisors and
caseworkers. Training has completely changed to
reflect the updated mission and values. Providers, meanwhile, were offered incentives to change
their services to reflect the new vision of child
welfare, and many adapted to the new goals. Of
Maine’s $10.4 million in original budget savings,
$4 million was reinvested in wraparound services.
The Maine General Assembly approved a perma-
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FIGURE 2 Maine Has Sustained and Improved Results Over Time

Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Children and Family Services, Monthly Management Report, July 2011.
**National AFCARS data, change from 2003 to 2009 for caseload data and 2004 to 2009 for congregate care data.
FIGURE 3 Maine Has Sustained and Improved Results Over Time

Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Children and Family Services, Monthly Management Report, July 2011.
**National AFCARS data, change from 2003 to 2009 for caseload data and 2004 to 2009 for congregate care data.

nent line item in the budget to continue the funding, given continued congregate care savings. The
original congregate care catalytic-combination
strategy, along with subsequent reforms, has had
a profound effect: The number of children in outof-home care has gone from 3,054 when reform
started in 2004 to 1,467 in August 2011 (Maine
Department of Health and Human Services,
2011). The decrease in the number of children in
congregate care has been dramatic, and Maine’s
reduction in the percentage of children in congregate care has far outpaced the national decline
(see Figure 2). Finally, the practice changes have
lead to a sustained increase in children staying
with relatives (see Figure 3). Maine’s child welfare
reform is held up as an example for creating more
effectiveness and efficiency in state government
that other agencies should emulate. In The Times
Record, the president of Maine Children’s Alliance and the child welfare agency ombudsmen
wrote:
The good news … is that fewer children enter state
custody, more remain secure in their communities,
and costs to the state are greatly reduced. … [M]ore
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effective care at less cost is exactly what we hope will
take place elsewhere in state government.” (Maine
Center for Economic Policy, 2011)

System reform is picking up steam in Virginia
through additional steps to produce improvement beyond right-sizing congregate care.
Virginia continues to push reform based on five
principles the state adopted earlier in its transformation effort: managing by data; engaging
families by a family-engagement teaming process
before any child’s entry into foster care; investing
in resource family recruitment, development, and
support; creating a continuum of communitybased services; and establishing regionalized,
competency-based training across Virginia.
In combination, these subsystem changes have
produced dramatic results: Far fewer children
are in foster care, and those who exit care are less
likely to re-enter the system (see Figure 4). Placements in group care have dropped dramatically
– from 25 percent to 15 percent – reflecting the
shift in resources from group care to community
based care (see Figure 5). Virginia started reform
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FIGURE 4 In Virginia, Far Fewer Children Are in Foster Care, and Those Who Exit Care Are Less Likely to Reenter the System

Source: February Critical Outcomes Report, Virginia Child Welfare Outcomes Report CFSAR data, Virginia Child Welfare Report
Services System Transformation Outcomes Report.
FIGURE 5 Virginia Is Meeting More Children's Needs in Community-Based Care, Rather than Congregate Care

Sources: Virginia Office of Comprehensive Services, Statewide Statistical Data.
http://www.csa.virginia.gov/publicstats/index.cfm, downloaded 9/26/11. Expenditures for 2001-2010:
Locality reports of CSA Medicaid Billings and CSA Pool expenditures; extrapolation of 2001-2008 trend by Annie E Casey Foundation.
Spending on congregate care & community-based spending 2007-2010: CSA Data Set statewide reports.

ranked 50th nationwide in exits to permanence,
between 2007 and 2010 exits to permanence
increased from 64 percent to 73 percent (Virginia Department of Social Services, 2011a). And
perhaps most impressively, Virginia did this by
decreasing spending by six percent per year after
years of relentless cost increases (see Figure 6),
saving the state more than $100 million compared
to projected costs (Virginia Department of Social
Services, 2011b).

THE

FoundationReview 2012 Vol 4:1

Conclusion
All of the child welfare systems described in this
article worked to expand their congregate care
reform as a way to influence the whole system and
to improve results for safety, permanence, and
well-being for children. Getting children out of
congregate care and into a safe, nurturing family
setting is a positive step in and of itself. Simultaneously, as part of a catalytic combination, reducing reliance on congregate care disrupted systems
and pushed them toward broader reform. In New
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FIGURE 6 Virginia Has Saved Over $100 Million Compared to Projected Costs by Placing and Connecting More Children with 		
		
Permanent Families

Sources: Virginia Office of Comprehensive Services, Statewide Statistical Data.
http://www.csa.virginia.gov/publicstats/index.cfm, downloaded 9/26/11. Expenditures for 2001-2010:
Locality reports of CSA Medicaid Billings and CSA Pool expenditures; extrapolation of 2001-2008 trend by Annie E Casey Foundation.
Spending on congregate care & community-based spending 2007-2010: CSA Data Set statewide reports.

York City, Maine, and Virginia, child welfare
leaders were able to use congregate care reduction (along with additional levers) to promote
and embed changes in programs, policies, and
procedures – and to improve the lives of children
and families. As the field continues struggling
with how to improve outcomes for children and
families, we suggest that all public-sector systems
look for interventions that are catalytic in nature.
Given the extreme budget cuts that child welfare
agencies have seen and will continue to see in the
foreseeable future, figuring out how to provide
better services with fewer resources is critical.
Based on our experience in moving complicated
and calcified child- and family-services systems in
a better direction, we believe that catalytic combinations are worthy of further support, experimentation, and study.

courage to accept responsibility for achieving the
results they seek”; he asserts that foundations can
do this by “creating the conditions for collaboration and innovation” (2009, p. 32). The CSCG
model suggests that public-sector agencies need
support in identifying and staging the combination of changes that will produce ongoing change.
The catalytic-combinations approach we describe,
and the role of the foundation in making the
change operational, presents a model for moving
toward catalytic philanthropy and social change.
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